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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
ESCRIBA V. FOSTER POULTRY FARMS, INC.
MAY LIMIT THE USE OF INVOLUNTARY LEAVE
AND
WHY THAT IS OKAY
Kyle R. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, America's social landscape was dominated by the
archetypical traditional family: a two-parent, one-income household
where the husband worked and the wife stayed at home to raise the
children. In 2013 however, only nine percent of all U.S. households
consisted of married couples with children where the husband was the
sole breadwinner.1 In response to this decrease in traditional families,
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA or the
Act) in 1993. The FMLA was intended to help families balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of their changing family
dynamics.4 The Act permits employees to take unpaid leave from the
workplace for qualified medical and family reasons without fear of
termination.
5
In the years since its passage, the FMLA has served as an important
tool for protecting employee rights in the workplace. However, as
employers struggled with compliance and employees began to abuse
their statutory leave, case law interpreting the Act provided a unique
method of empowering employers as well. Specifically, most federal
courts have recognized an employer's independent fight to designate a
leave of absence as FMLA leave, even if an employee explicitly states a
desire not to use such leave. 6  Known as placing an employee on
"involuntary leave," this practice offers employers greater control when
complying with FMLA regulations while simultaneously allowing them
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Class of 2016.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS
OF FAMILIES-2013 (Apr. 25, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/famee_04252014.pdf.
2. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006) ("Congress finds
that-(l) the number of single-parent households and two-parent households in which the single parent
or both parents work is increasing significantly[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 260 1(a)(1).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
4. Id. § 2601.
5. Id. §§ 2601-2654.
6. Jennifer R. Asbrock, Recent FMLA Decision May Result in Leave Hoarding, THE LAW @
WORK (Thompson Hine, Cleveland, Ohio), Summer 2014, at 1,
http://www.thompsonhine.com/uploads/l 135/doc/Newsletter-_Law@Work_-_Summer 2014.pdf.
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to combat abuse. In particular, this method has provided some
protection against employee "leave hoarding," a type of abuse where
employees exploit the FMLA to stockpile more leave than they are
eligible to receive.
7
However, a recent court of appeals decision in the Ninth Circuit
declared that an employer may no longer place an employee on FMLA
leave involuntarily, thus creating a split on the issue with other circuits,
including the Sixth Circuit. If the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is adopted
by other circuits, it may open the door to increased abuse of the Act in
the future.
This Casenote ultimately will argue that, despite the concerns about
leave hoarding, the Sixth Circuit should adopt the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.,9 as it is more
consistent with the legislative intent of the FMLA and provides
additional freedom for employees to designate when they take time off
work. Part II of this Casenote will lay the foundation for this argument
by discussing the history of the FMLA and providing an overview of the
language of the statute. Part III is dedicated to the facts, procedure, and
rationale of two cases: Wysong v. Dow Chemical Company10 and
Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.11  Wysong, a Sixth Circuit
decision, was one of the first authorities on the subject of involuntary
leave and has served as a guide for other districts. 12 Escriba is the
recent Ninth Circuit decision that shakes the foundations of the
reasoning in Wysong. Part IV analyzes these decisions and their
implication on current and future employees and employers. Finally,
Part V will conclude that the Sixth Circuit should adopt the rule set forth
in Escriba.
II. BACKGROUND
The FMLA is a surprisingly concise statute and provides employees
with certain rights that cannot be waived by an employer. The statute
also regulates the manner in which qualified employees request and take
leave under the Act. While FMLA leave is limited, the legislative
history suggests the FMLA was meant to be interpreted liberally and
construed to provide broad protection for employees, including greater
7. Id.
8. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014).
9. Id.
10. Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2007).
11. Escriba, 743 F.3d 1236.
12. See e.g., Pagel v. Tin Inc., 695 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2012); Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals
Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (10th Cir. 2014).
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flexibility when requesting time off from work.
A. The Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 allows eligible
employees to take a maximum of twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year
without fear of termination. 13  In the Act, Congress provided the
Secretary of Labor with the authority to administer the FMLA. 14 Thus,
the Department of Labor (DOL) has issued a series of regulations that
aid in the interpretation of the statute. 15 Therefore, both the statute and
the ensuing DOL regulations have limited FMLA leave in a number of
ways. 16
First, the FMLA applies only to employers with fifty or more
employees. 17  Second, the Act applies only to leaves of absence for
specified reasons. 18 These reasons include: (a) the birth of a child, (b)
the adoption of a child or placement of a foster child, (c) the care of a
spouse or immediate family member who has a serious health condition,
or (d) the recovery from a serious health condition that makes
employees unable to perform the functions required by their job. 19 A
"serious health condition" is defined by the statute as a physical or
mental condition that involves: (a) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice,
or residential medical care facility; or (b) continuing treatment by a
health care provider. Third, leave is available only to "eligible
employees." An eligible employee is a person who has been an
employee of the company for at least twelve months and has worked at
least 1,250 hours during the twelve month period immediately preceding
the request for leave. Finally, an employer may require certification
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2601. The FMLA was the first major piece of legislation passed by President
Bill Clinton. See Jill Zuckman, As Family Leave Is Enacted, Some See End to Logjam, 51 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 267, 267 (1993). For a primer on the subject, see GERALD MAYER, CONG. RES. SERV.,
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA): AN OVERVIEW (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42758.pdf.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 2654.
15. These regulations are codified in 29 C.F.R § 825 (2013).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). The Act also applies to work sites that have less than fifty
employees when there are a total of fifty or more employees within seventy five miles of the worksite in
question. Id. § 2611(2)(b)(ii).
18. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D). These are known colloquially as "FMLA qualifying events."
19. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D). The Act also allows extended leave to military members and their
families. However, the rules governing military leave often differ from ordinary FMLA leave.
Accordingly, military leave will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity.
20. Id. § 2611(11).
21. Id. §2611(2).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(2)(a)(i)-(ii). The 12-month period may be consecutive or non-consecutive.
See Thomas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 251 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 2001). 1,250 hours is approximately twenty
2016]
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by a health care provider for a leave based on a serious health condition
and has the power to request a second medical opinion related to the
illness from a different health care provider.23
1. Protections Provided by the Act
If an employee qualifies for leave under the FMLA, he or she
immediately is afforded a number of protections. For example, the Act
requires employers to allow the leave of absence and to restore
employees to their former positions or an equivalent position upon their
return.24  Furthermore, the Act requires employers to maintain health
insurance coverage for employees taking FMLA leave. 25 The FMLA
also prohibits employers subject to the Act from interfering with,
restraining, or denying the exercise of any right provided under the
Act.
26
2. Unpaid Leave
While FMLA leave generally is unpaid,27 the Act and Code of
Federal Regulations (Code) allows employees to use accrued paid leave28
at the same time as their FMLA leave. This allows the employee to
receive pay while still benefitting from the protections of the FMLA.
However, a paid leave counts against both the employee's accrued time
off and their twelve week FMLA leave, effectively depleting the two
leaves concurrently.
29
The Code also dictates that an employee's ability to use paid leave
and FMLA leave concurrently is governed by the terms and conditions
of the employer's standard leave policy. Accordingly, the employee
must comply with any additional requirements imposed by the employer
to receive the benefit of the FMLA protections. In certain
circumstances, the Code also permits employers to require employees to
five hours per week. This threshold often means part-time employees do not qualify for FMLA leave.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
24. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B).
25. Id. § 2614(c).
26. Id. § 2615(a)(1); see also Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441,447 (6th Cir. 2007).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (c).
28. 29 C.F.R § 825.207(a). Technically, an employee is allowed to "substitute" accrued paid
leave for FMLA leave. However, the definition of substitute provides that "the paid leave provided by
the employer and accrued pursuant to established policies of the employer will run concurrently with the
unpaid FMLA leave." Id. An employee potentially could use accrued leave for the full twelve weeks.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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take paid leave concurrently with FMLA, even if the employee
otherwise would decline to do so. 3 2  Conversely, non-FMLA leave,
either unpaid or paid, does not affect an employee's entitlement to
twelve weeks of FMLA leave. 33 For example, paid sick leave due to a
medical condition that is not a "serious health condition" does not count
against the twelve week FMLA allotment.
3. Notice Requirements
The FMLA also requires that an employee notify his employer if he
intends to utilize the FMLA leave. 34  When the need for leave is
foreseeable, employees must provide employers with at least thirty days
of advance notice before the leave begins. 35 If the reason for leave is
not foreseeable, an employee must notify the employer as soon as is
practicable. 36  As soon as is practicable generally means that an
employee must notify the employer on either the same day or next
business day of the need for leave.37 Employees generally are expected
to follow the employer's established procedures for requesting leave.
38
4. Remedies Under the Act
Should a FMLA violation occur any eligible employee may bring a
civil action against his employer. 3  Penalties for a violation are harsh
and include employer liability for lost wages, out-of- ocket expenses,
double damages, equitable relief, and attorneys' fees. E Typically, an
employee alleges a violation by using one of two recovery theories: the
interference theory or the retaliation theory. 4 1 Under the interference
theory, an employee claims the employer has interfered with or denied a
right provided by the FMLA.42 To succeed on this claim, the employee
must prove that: (1) the employee is an eligible employee, (2) the
defendant is an employer, (3) the employee was entitled to leave under
the FMLA, (4) the employee gave the employer notice of his or her
32. Id.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a).
34. Id. §§ 825.302-303; see also MAYER, supra note 13.
35. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-303.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a).
40. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(2), respectively. For the sake of simplicity,
this Casenote will only address the interference theory.
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
2016]
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intention to take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee the
FMLA benefits to which he or she was entitled.43 The retaliation theory
states that an employer is prohibited from retaliating against an
employee for having exercised any FMLA right.
44
5. Involuntary Leave
The Sixth Circuit recognizes that an employee's FMLA rights may be
interfered with when the employee is placed on involuntary leave in
violation of the FMLA.45 Accordingly, an employee may have a cause
of action against his or her employer when placed on FMLA leave
involuntarily.46  As in any civil suit, the employee also must have
standing to sue. In the Sixth Circuit, an employee has standing only if
the employee seeks FMLA leave and that leave is not available because
the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.47
Interestingly, the FMLA and the DOL Regulations do not address
whether an employer has the ability to place an employee on FMLA
leave involuntarily. Thus, an employer's ability to place an employee
on FMLA leave involuntarily is governed by case law. However, most
federal courts recognize an employer's independent right to designate a
leave of absence as FMLA leave for FMLA-qualifying events, even if
an employee explicitly declines to designate it as such.48 To exercise
this right, the employer must show reasonable verification that the leave
indeed was taken for a FMLA-qualifying event and must provide notice
to the employee.
49
Typically, involuntary leave suits arise from one of two scenarios.
The first scenario occurs when an employee takes time off from work
for a non-FMLA-qualifying event and the employer wrongfully places
the employee on FMLA leave, thus depriving the individual of the
benefit of FMLA protection in the future. 0 The second scenario occurs
when an employee takes non-FMLA leave for a FMLA-qualifying event
and subsequently is terminated.
43. Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441,447 (6th Cir. 2007).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 and 29 CFR § 825.220(c).
45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 448-49.
47. Id. at 449.
48. Asbrock, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. See e.g., Walker v. Trinity Marine Products, inc., 721 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
Walker v. Trinity Marine Products, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 1293 (2014). See also Hicks v. LeRoy's Jewelers,
Inc., No. 98-6596, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17568 (6th Cir. July 17, 2000).
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6. Relationship to State Law
Because the FMLA is federal law, both the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution and the language of the FMLA itself mandate that the Act
preempts any state law related to leave of absence. 51 This preemption is
consistent with Congress's intent to create a unified national standard
for medical leave.52 However, this declaration is subject to one very
large caveat-nothing in the FMLA supersedes any state law that
provides more benefits to employees for family or medical leave.
53
Therefore, individual states are free to pass modified statutes pertaining
to leave so long as they do not restrict the rights provided by the FMLA.
While Ohio has not passed its own comprehensive state Medical Leave
Act, the legislature has passed additional statutes relating to parental
leave (Ohio Act).54 However, the Ohio Act only applies to individuals
who are employed by the state government and does not affect private
employers.
In Ohio, public employees who work for thirty or more hours per
week are entitled to six weeks of leave for the birth or adoption of a
child under the Ohio Act. In contrast to the FMLA, the Ohio Act
provides that four of the six weeks are paid, at seventy percent of the
employee's base pay. The statute mandates the first two weeks of the
leave are a "waiting period" and thus are unpaid.56 Finally, if an
employee is eligible to receive FMLA leave, he or she has the option to
use either FMLA leave or leave under the Ohio Act, whichever is more
generous. 57 If the employee chooses to take leave under the Ohio Act,
such leave also will count against the twelve week FMLA entitlement if
the leave otherwise would have been available under the FMLA.58
The resulting interplay of these statues means that public employees
may have access to more leave than the FMLA provides. For example,
an employee who has used her entire twelve weeks of FMLA leave to
51. 29 U.S.C. § 2651.
52. S. REP.No. 103-3, at3 (1993).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b). Examples provided by the senate include, among others, an Oregon
law the provides twelve weeks of parental leave for eligible employees who work for employers of
twenty-five or more persons, rather than the fifty required by the FMLA, and a California law that
provides up to sixteen weeks of leave over two years for the birth or adoption of a child. S. REP. No.
103-3, at 13.
54. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.136 (West). Nor has any other state in the Sixth Circuit passed
its own comprehensive state FMLA laws.
55. Id.
56. Id. However, the employee may use his accrued paid time off during this waiting period. If
he chooses to do so, such use will diminish leave under both the Ohio Act and the employee's accrued
paid leave.
57. Id.
58. Id.
2016]
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care for a serious medical condition at the beginning of the year can take
an additional six weeks off work if she has a child later in the year.
Alternatively, a public employee can use leave provided by the FMLA
and the Ohio Act to receive four weeks of paid time off without using
accrued personal leave, thus allowing that employee to save personal
leave for use at a future date.
B. Legislative History
In the forty years before the Act was passed, Congress observed a
dramatic change in the landscape of the American workforce. In that
time period, the number of women in the workforce increased by 200%,
the number of single-income households decreased, and employees
faced increasing demands in the workplace. 59 After finding a lack of
employment policies designed to accommodate working Jarents,
Congress introduced the first family leave legislation in 1985. Some
eight years later, the final form of the FMLA was signed into law,
guaranteeing employees a minimum amount of annual leave to balance
the demands of their personal and professional lives. 61 The Act was
based on the same principles as child labor laws, minimum wage laws,
Social Security laws, safety and health laws, pension and welfare benefit
laws, and other labor laws that establish minimum standards for
employment. 62
While extensive, the legislative history of the FMLA demonstrates a
consistent purpose throughout: to provide both beneficial rights and
greater job security to employees. For example, it was Congress's
desire for the FMLA to protect an abundant and wide range of
employees, rather than a particular class of individuals. 63 This is most
noticeable in Congress's decision to extend FMLA leave to fathers, in
addition to mothers, for the birth of a child. Furthermore, Congress
sought to protect a wide range of benefits for these employees, including
the maintenance of health benefits, the restoration to a same or
equivalent position upon the employees' return from leave, and
protection against termination. 64 It also believed the Act would lead to
59. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4-7.
60. Megan E. Bloomquist, Comment, A Shield, Not a Sword: Involuntary leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH L. REv. 509, 521 (200 1).
61. Id.
62. S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 4.
63. See generally S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993). The Senate Report discusses changing economic
and familial situations for, inter alia, women, men, the elderly and low-wage workers. The adopted
version of the Act provides protections to low-wage workers, employees of all ages, males and females,
and those with serious health conditions or whose family members suffer from such a condition.
64. Id. at 12-13.
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cost savings for employers by reducing hiring and training costs,
turnover, and absenteeism.
65
Some of the legislators who opposed the FMLA argued that it was too
favorable to employees. 66 The legislative history contains references to
comments by legislators noting that the Act "allows employees almost
unrestrained discretion as to when to take leave" 67 and "rants the
employee a unilateral right to schedule and take the leave." Others
have argued that the FMLA does not provide enough protection to
employees and that it has "serious limitations" that "disproportionately
affect women, especially middle- and low-income women" because it
does not guarantee paid time off.69 However, the final version of the
FMLA was not modified to accommodate either of these critics'
concerns. It is worth noting that the final language of the Act
encourages employers to adopt leave policies that are more generous
than those provided by the FMLA, but does not guarantee paid time
off.7
III. RECENT DECISIONS
Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co.,7 1 decided by the Sixth Circuit, was
one of the first cases to address involuntary leave. It allows employers
to place employees on FMLA leave unilaterally and is the standard
analysis for involuntary leave claims in the Sixth Circuit. However, its
reasoning has not been accepted by all circuits. Most notably, the Ninth
Circuit recently decided Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.,72 which,
while not explicitly overruling the Sixth Circuit, seems to suggest
federal courts are ready for a departure from Wysong's holding.
A. Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co.
Kimberly Wysong worked for the Dow Chemical Company (Dow) as
an Operating Technician.7 3 Wysong had an unfortunate medical history
that often required her to miss work.74 In February of 2003, her boss,
65. Id.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 68, 70 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 21 (1993).
67. H.R. REp. No. 103-8, pt. I at 70.
68. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2 at 21.
69. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-
Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U.J. GENDER SOCIAL POL'Y & L. 459, 460 (2008).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 2653.
71. Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2007).
72. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014).
73. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 443.
74. Id. In fact, in 2001, Wysong took 464 hours of paid medical leave (roughly 58 days) and
2016]
9
Miller: The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms,
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
Dwight Miller, issued Wysong a "Letter of Concern" notifying her that
she had exhausted all of her paid medical leave. The letter informed
Wysong that if she required additional leave, such leave would be
without pay. 75 Approximately ten days later, Wysong reported to work
late and was issued a "last chance letter," informing her that she would
be terminated for any future performance failures.
76
Roughly two months passed without incident. However, in May of
2003, Wysong contacted the plant nurse to report a neck problem. 77 She
did not request any time off to deal with this health issue.78 However,
her supervisor learned of the report and contacted Dr. Teter, Dow's
Regional Medical Director.79  Dr. Teter placed Wysong on work
restrictions that prohibited her from lifting more than five pounds.8s Her
supervisor ultimately determined that he could not find a job at the plant
that would comply with the doctor's restrictions and informed Wysong
not to come into work.
81
Two days later, Wysong received a letter from Dow informing her
82that her "request" for FMLA leave was approved. The letter further
stated that Wysong previously had exhausted the majority of her FMLA
leave and she was eligible for only three additional days of FMLA
leave.83 Because Wysong had not requested FMLA leave, she sought
clarification of the letter from Dow's Human Resources Department
(HR Department).84
In response, the HR Department removed the language about her
request, but explained that she had been placed on FMLA leave
nonetheless. 85 In the interim, Dow's medical board met to review her
case.86 It determined that Wysong would need to pass a Functional
87Capacity Exam (FCE) prior to returning to work. A FCE is a series of
tasks that an employee must complete to demonstrate that he or she is
nearly doubled that number in 2002 when she took 783.5 hours (roughly 97 days). Reasons she
provided included: chronic neck and groin pain, a hernia operation, mononucleosis, a hysterectomy, and
caring for an ill child. Id.
75. Id. She also could have used her paid vacation time.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 443. The Plant Nurse reported Wysong's complaint to Dow's
Environmental Health and Safety Director Troy Dehoff. Mr. Dehoff, in turn, notified Dwight Miller.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 443.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 445.
87. Id.
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physically capable of performing the necessary job duties. 88 Prior to
administering the FCE, Dr. Teter requested that Wysong stop taking all
pain medications for two weeks.89 On the advice of her doctors, she
refused to do so. As a result, she was placed on unpaid leave until she
received a release to work without restrictions. 91 Six months later, Dow
terminated Wysong pursuant to a company policy that allowed the
company to terminate employees on medical leave for six months or
more.
92
Wysong brought suit in the Southern District of Ohio and alleged a
violation of the FMLA. 93 Wysong alleged Dow was liable under the
FMLA when it forced her to take her last three days of FMLA leave
when she did not elect to do so and that this involuntary leave interfered
with her FMLA rights. The district court granted summary judgment to
Dow, and Wysong appealed.
94
The Sixth Circuit found that a plaintiff may only succeed under this
cause of action when an employer forces him or her to take FMLA leave
and he or she does not have a serious health condition or other FMLA-
qualifying event. 95 More importantly, the court stated that an employee
may only bring a claim of involuntary leave when he or she seeks
FMLA leave at a later date and the leave is unavailable because he or
she was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.96 The Sixth
Circuit ultimately dismissed Wysong's involuntary leave claim on this
ground, holding that "she cannot show that she was denied FMLA leave
to which she was entitled as a result of Dow forcing her to take earlier
leave when she did not have a 'serious health condition' that precluded
her from working."
97
B. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms Inc.
Maria Escriba worked in a Foster Poultry Farms (Foster Farms)
88. Id.
89. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 445. Dr. Teter was also concerned that Wysong was exhibiting "drug-
seeking behavior" and feared she was "drug dependent." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 446.
95. Id. at 449. ("An involuntary-leave claim is really a type of interference claim. An employee
may have a claim under §2615(a)(1) when an employer forces an employee to take FMLA leave when
the employee does not have a 'serious health condition' that precludes her from working".). Id. at 448
(citing Hicks v. LeRoy's Jewelers, Inc., No. 98-6596, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17568 (6th Cir. July 17,
2000)).
96. Id. at 449.
97. Id. at 450.
2016]
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processing plant for eighteen years. 98 A native of Guatemala, Escriba
spoke fluent Spanish but limited English.99 In 2007, Escriba met with
her supervisor, Linda Mendoza, to request two weeks off from work to
care for her sick father in Guatemala. In response to this request, and
in compliance with Foster Farms' employee leave policy, Mendoza
provided paperwork that documented the details of a two-week vacation
request, during which Escriba would use her paid vacation time rather
than FMLA leave. 1
0 1
After this initial exchange, Mendoza requested the service of an
interpreter. When the interpreter asked Escriba if she needed more than
two weeks paid vacation in Guatemala, Escriba responded "no., 10 2 The
interpreter again asked if she "needed more time in Guatemala[,]" and
Escriba again responded "no." 10 3  After finalizing her two weeks of
leave, Escriba traveled to Guatemala to care for her father. 10 4  She
testified that shortly after arriving in Guatemala, she decided that
returning to work after two weeks would be impractical. 05 Sixteen days
after she was scheduled to return to work, Escriba contacted a union
representative. 106 The union representative informed Escriba that she
likely would be fired under Foster Farms' "three day no-show, no-call
rule". 07 This rule, included in the Foster Farms employee handbook,
allowed Foster Farms to terminate any employee who, without giving
notice to the company, was absent from work for three consecutive
days. 1 8 Under this policy, Escriba was fired. 109
Escriba filed suit, alleging violations of the FMLA." 0  At trial,
Escriba argued that her employer knew she was taking time off for an
FMLA-qualifying event-to care for her ailing father-therefore, she
was entitled to FMLA leave even though she did not formally request its
protection."' Foster Farms argued that even though Escriba provided
98. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014). The reader
should note that the facts in this case were heavily contested and this statement of facts largely
represents Escriba's position.
99. Id. at 1240.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1240.
104. Id. at 1241.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1241.
109. Id. at 1239.
110. Id. at 1242. Escriba also claimed violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA),
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2, and California public policy. Id.
11. Id. at 1242-43.
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an FMLA-qualifying reason for taking leave, she declined to have her
time off qualify as FMLA leave and, therefore, was not afforded its
protection against termination. 112 The jury delivered a verdict in favor
of Foster Farms. Escriba filed a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law (JMOL), 113 which the judge denied, stating "Escriba...
was given the option and prompted to exercise her right to take FMLA-
leave, but ... unequivocally refused to exercise that riht."
14 Escriba
appealed the judgment against her to the Ninth Circuit. 
11-5
The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the lower court, and held
that Foster Farms legally could terminate Escriba. It began its analysis
by finding that Escriba's suit was based on an FMLA interference
claim.116 To make out a prima facie case of FMLA interference in the
Ninth Circuit, an employee must establish that, inter alia, she provided
sufficient notice of her intent to take leave. 117 The court found the
FMLA does not expressly state whether employees may choose to delay
the use of their FMLA rights under the law. However, it reasoned
that the FMLA regulations provided guidance in this situation. 119 The
regulations state that the employer has the responsibility to determine
whether "FMLA leave is being sought by the employee." r20
The court concluded that "an employer's obligation to ascertain
'whether FMLA leave is being sought' strongly suggests that there are
circumstances in which an employee might seek time off but not intend
to exercise his or her rights under the FMLA., 121 As a result, the court
reached the conclusion that an employee can affirmatively decline to use
FMLA leave, even if the underlying reason for seeking the leave would
have warranted FMLA protection. r22 The court held that Ms. Escriba
elected not to use her FMLA leave and, therefore, could be fired without
violating the FMLA. 123
112. Id. at 1242.
113. JMOL is a motion made by a party during trial claiming the opposing party has insufficient
evidence to reasonably support its case. It is similar to summary judgment but occurs during the trial,
whereas a motion for summary judgment happens after discovery and before trial. IMOL also is known
as a directed verdict.
114. Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1242.
115. See generally id
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1243.
120. Id. ("The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the
FMLA, but the employer should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more
information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee .. ") (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 1244.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The Sixth Circuit has relied on the Wysong decision to stand for a
number of legal principles. Most relevantly, the Wysong opinion
reiterates the idea that an employer may place an employee on FMLA
leave involuntarily so long as the leave is for an FMLA-qualifying
event. 124 While Wysong did not prevail on her involuntary leave claim,
the court appears to recognize the validity of such a cause of action.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Escriba, however, is a departure from
the principle in Wysong that an employer may place an employee on
FMLA leave without the employee's consent. Rather, the holding
suggests that employees have the ability to choose when they take
FMLA leave, including the ability to delay use of FMLA leave until it is
most beneficial to them. While this proposition could lead to increased
abuse of FMLA leave, the Escriba decision is more consistent with the
legislative intent of the FMLA, and any potential increase in abuse is
outweighed by the additional benefits provided to employees who do not
abuse the system. As a result, the Sixth Circuit should adopt the rule
espoused by the Escriba court.
A. Practical Effect of Wysong
The practical effect of Wysong is that employers have been able to
place employees on FMLA leave against their wishes, thus minimizing
abuse, so long as that employee has an FMLA qualifying event. In other
words, employees have not been able to save FMLA leave for later use
if their employer would prefer the "FMLA clock" to start ticking after
an FMLA-qualifying event occurs. For example, assume an employee
has accrued four weeks of vacation time and wishes to take a leave of
absence to care for his ailing mother. Under Wysong, the employee
would not be able to take four weeks off from work using his vacation
time and then receive an additional twelve weeks of unpaid FMLA
protection at a later date, leading to a total of sixteen weeks off of
125
work. Rather, under Wysong 's interpretation of FMLA, the employer
124. Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441,448-49 (6th Cir. 2007).
125. This also is supported by 29 C.F.R § 825.207(a) and case law in other circuits. See e.g.,
Strickland v. Waterworks and Sewer Board of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1205-06 (11 th
Cir. 2001). The employer may only do so in accordance with the employer's normal leave policy and
upon notice to the employee. 29 C.F.R § 825.207(a). And, in the words of the Eleventh Circuit:
The logical purpose underlying the substitution language in the FMLA and accompanying
regulations is to protect employers who offer paid sick leave benefits to their employees from
having to provide both the statutory 12 weeks of leave required by the FMLA and the paid
leave benefit separately. If employers could not require a sick employee to use accrued paid
sick leave and FMLA leave concurrently when the employee's condition qualifies for both,
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could place the employee on involuntary FMLA leave immediately and
substitute the paid leave for FMLA leave. This would entitle the
employee to four weeks of paid leave plus an additional eight weeks of
unpaid FMLA leave for a total of twelve weeks of FMLA leave. 1
26
The rationale in Wysong also seems to suggest that employees have
immediate protection from termination any time they take leave for a
FMLA-qualifying event, even if they do not request FMLA leave. 127 In
essence, this allows employees to raise a claim of FMLA interference
any time they take leave for a FMLA-qualifying event and argue that
they were automatically entitled to FMLA protection, even though they
were not actually placed on FMLA leave. 128 This creates an added level
of protection for employees.
This standard has encouraged employers to draft leave policies very
carefully, as employers prefer an employee's FMLA leave to begin as
soon as possible. Usually, this is done in an effort to guard against
employees who abuse leaves of absence-particularly, when the
language of the Act allows employees to utilize other, more favorable
types of leave that offer additional time off. An extreme example of this
situation is provided in the case of Ms. Wysong. Wysong used 464
hours of paid medical leave (roughly 58 days) in 2001, and nearly
doubled that number in 2002 when she took 783.5 hours (roughly 97
days) off of work. Despite missing nearly one-third of the year (which
is 37 days more than is allowed by the FMLA), she remained entitled to
three additional days of FMLA leave before her termination. This case
demonstrates that the FMLA can provide the employee with
significantly more time off than the twelve weeks envisioned by the
drafters of the FMLA, and employers prefer to place employees on
FMLA leave as soon as possible. While extended leave may benefit the
employee, clearly, it is not desirable for employers as it reduces
productivity, increases costs, and adds bureaucratic headaches to the
administration of employee leave policies.
then the employee could choose to use his paid leave benefit and his 12 weeks of FMLA
leave sequentially. That would unduly and unfairly burden employers. To balance the needs
of employers and sick employees, Congress intended that the FMLA provide employees with
a minimum entitlement of 12 weeks of leave, while protecting employers against employees
tacking their FMLA entitlement on to any paid leave benefit offered by the employer.
Strickland v Waterworks and Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1205-06
(1 1th Cir. 2001).
126. Again, the same additional requirements of notice, proper documentation, and a written
employee leave policy are applicable. 29 C.F.R § 825.207.
127. See e.g., Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014).
128. Id.
2016]
15
Miller: The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms,
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
B. Differences Between Escriba and Wysong
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Escriba departs from the principle
that an employer unilaterally may place an employee on FMLA leave
for FMLA-qualifying events. 129  This decision creates interesting
ramifications for both employees and employers in the Ninth Circuit.
Notably, the Escriba court agreed with the employer, accepting the
premise that the plaintiff could, and in fact did, decline to use her
available FMLA leave to preserve future FMLA leave. 130 Accordingly,
the employer could then lawfully terminate the plaintiff for failing to
comply with the attendance policy when she took leave for a FMLA-
qualifying purpose but specifically declined to invoke FMLA leave.131
Thus, the Escriba decision is a win for the employer in that scenario.
Even though the result of the case was favorable for the employer, the
reasoning in the opinion may be used against employers in future
litigation. For example, if an employee has the power to decline use of
FMLA leave, that power also may preclude employers from designating
FMLA leave against an employee's wishes. Consequently, employees
who are aware of this power may be able to hoard their FMLA leave by
preventing an employer from placing them on FMLA leave
involuntarily. In other words, the Ninth Circuit has allowed employees
to postpone use of their FMLA rights until the use is most favorable for
the employee. Under Escriba, an employee who has accrued four weeks
of paid vacation time is now able to use all four weeks of vacation time
prior to claiming twelve additional weeks of FMLA leave. On its face,
this would appear to be a deviation from current law in the Sixth Circuit
and inconsistent with the interpretation of the FMLA provided by other
circuits. 132 While this ruling was detrimental to the plaintiff in Escriba,
the court's reasoning is a foundational shift in the way employees are
placed on FMLA leave, and opens the door for employer liability suits if
employers involuntarily place employees on FMLA leave in the future.
As a result, employers must be careful when placing an employee on
FMLA leave without his or her consent-even if the employee
potentially is abusing his or her right to FMLA leave.
129. See generally id.
130. Id. at 1244.
131. Id. at 1244-45.
132. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Strickland that the purpose of the "FMLA and
accompanying regulations is to protect employers who offer paid sick leave benefits to their employees
from having to provide both the statutory 12 weeks of leave required by the FMLA and the paid leave
benefit separately." 239 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2001).
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C. The Sixth Circuit Should Adopt the Ruling in Escriba
Although Escriba was decided in the Ninth Circuit, it has real
implications on future jurisprudence in the Sixth Circuit. Interestingly,
the opinion was written by Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, a Sixth Circuit
judge sitting by designation. 133 Because the authoring judge is from the
Sixth Circuit, the Escriba decision may reflect the Sixth Circuit's
openness to a change in the law. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit should
adopt the holding of the Escriba court, because its reasoning is more
consistent with the legislative history of the FMLA and Congress's
intent in passing the Act. Additionally, the Escriba rationale relies more
directly on statutory interpretation and has favorable policy
implications.
1. Escriba is More Consistent with the Congressional Intent of the
FMLA
In addition to Congress's stated intent for the FMLA to "entitle
employees to take reasonable leave for [family] and medical reasons," 134
the FMLA includes a number of sections that encourage courts to
construe the meaning of its language in favor of employees (Liberal
Construction Provisions). 135 These Liberal Construction Provisions can
be understood, in combination with legislative reports relevant to the
passage of the Act, to create a minimum standard for leave that courts
should expand whenever possible. These sections include provisions
preventing the Act from modifying any federal or state law which
prohibits discrimination or state laws that provide greater medical leave
rights to employees (including collective bargaining agreements and
other benefit programs). 136  The Act itself expressly states that it is
designed for the "encouragement of more generous leave policies.,
137
These clauses, when taken as a whole, indicate that Congress intended
the FMLA to act as a minimum requirement. Accordingly, the FMLA
should be interpreted to give employees as many rights as possible in the
future. As a result, when the statute is silent, it should be interpreted in
favor of employee rather than employer.
Furthermore, it is worth reiterating that some of the legislators who
opposed the FMLA did so on grounds that it was too favorable to
133. In this case, Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sat by designation. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236,
1238 (6th Cir. 2014).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
135. Id. §§2651-53.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 2653.
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employees. 138 Therefore, by adopting the Act without accommodating
these arguments, Congress implicitly rejected these concerns. It
recognized that the Act was designed to provide employees with
increased flexibility for designating when they take medical and family
leave.
Based on the legislative history of the Act and the inclusion of Liberal
Construction Provisions, the FMLA appears to support the notion that
individual employees have the right to choose when to use their FMLA
leave. In other words, the Ninth Circuit's indication that employers
should not have unilateral authority to place employees on FMLA leave
appears to be a correct interpretation of the FMLA based on Congress's
intent when passing the Act.
However, this conclusion is inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Wysong. The Wysong court has restricted an employee's
freedom to claim FMLA rights at times of his or her choosing, and,
instead, has allowed employers to start the "FMLA clock" anytime an
FMLA-qualifying event occurs, regardless of the employee's intentions.
Because this reasoning contradicts the legislative history of the FMLA
and Congress's intent in passing the Act, the Wysong decision should be
overruled as inconsistent with the spirit of the Act.
2. Policy Concerns
The recent holding in Escriba seems to suggest that employees have
the ability to choose when they take FMLA leave-including the ability
to delay use of FMLA leave until it is most beneficial to them. While
this proposition could lead to increased abuse of FMLA leave, any
potential increase in abuse is outweighed by the additional benefits
provided to employees who do not abuse the system. As a result, the
Sixth Circuit should adopt the holding of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Escriba.
First and foremost, most employees that use FMLA leave have an
excess of FMLA leave available to them. 139 Therefore, there is little
incentive for an employee to game the system to receive more leave, as
time off is already freely available. Specifically, the DOL indicates that
13% of employees used FMLA leave in the past year.140 Of those 13%,
the average leave was 27.8 days, 141 leaving an average of 32.3 days of
138. See H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 68, 70 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 21 (1993).
139. Michael Starosciak, FMLA Infographic: Key Statistics on Policies and Usage, DATAMATICS
MGMT. SERVS. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://blog.datamaticsinc.com/2013/02/fmila-infographic-key-statistics-
on-policies-and-usage.html.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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unused leave. 142  This means that, on average, employees who use
FMLA still have more than four weeks of FMLA leave available to
them at any one time. Because most employees are leaving large
amounts of FMLA leave unused, they have no reason to attempt to
acquire more leave time. This factor minimizes any potential abuse by
reducing the incentive to leave horde, as additional time off already is
available to most employees.
Even though there is little incentive for an individual employee to
seek additional time off, an employee nonetheless may attempt to abuse
the system by manipulating the timing of the FMLA leave. However,
direct evidence supports the notion that this type of abuse occurs very
infrequently and would not lead to serious consequences for an
employer on a large scale. For example, a survey conducted by the
DOL found FMLA was abused in only 2.5% of leaves. 143  Since a
majority of workers do not even use FMLA leave, this translates to a
problem that affects less than .000325% of employees in the United
States.144
IV. CONCLUSION
After many years of revisions and compromises, Congress enacted
the FMLA in 1993, guaranteeing employees a minimum amount of
annual leave. 14 5  While Congress recognized the need to protect an
employer's legitimate interest in maximizing efficiency, the Sixth
Circuit has overextended this protection by restricting employees'
freedom to claim their FMLA rights at the time of their choosing.
The decision in Wysong allows employers to start the "FMLA clock"
anytime an FMLA-qualifying event occurs, regardless of the employee's
wishes. Practically, this allows employers to use the FMLA offensively
against its employees-a practice that seems inconsistent with
Congress's intent to "balance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families and to allow employees reasonable leave for the
treatment of medical issues."
146
142. (60 days of allowed leave under the FMLA) - (27.8 days used) = 32.3 days remaining on
average.
143. See R.I. DEP'T OF LABOR & TRAINING, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR MARKET
INFORMATION, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/laus/us/usadj.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
144. This number was calculated assuming 13% of employees used FMLA and employers
estimated there was abuse in 2.5% of FMLA leaves. To reach this summation, the author multiplied
2.5% x 13% = .000325. This works out to roughly 50,790 employees total in the United States based on
an average of 156,278,000 people in the work force in October of 2014. See R.I. DEP'T OF LABOR &
TRAINING, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 143.
145. 29U.S.C. § 2601(b).
146. See generally id.
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Fortunately, the recent decision in Escriba appears to be the first step
in a judicial departure from this misguided legal principal. The Escriba
decision is more consistent with the language of the Act, the legislative
history, and Congress's attempt to create a powerful tool for employee
protection. Escriba finally may be the first step in returning the power
and protections of the FMLA back into the hands of employees.
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